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JUDICIAL SELECTION METHODS: JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
AND POPULAR DEMOCRACY
ELIZABETH A. LARKIN*

I. INTRODUCTION
The debate over selecting and retaining judges is long standing and
reflects a fundamental disagreement regarding a judge's political and
social role.' There exists a tension between a judge's dual role as a lawmaker and interpreter of existing law.2
One view, functionalism, maintains that the courts serve as an institutional check on the legislative and executive branches3 and that judicial independence is essential for the judiciary to protect the rule of law.4
To function effectively, judges must be free from the influence of the
electorate, the executive, and the legislature.5
In tension with the idea of judicial independence is the need for
judicial accountability. 6 Judges must be aware of the majority's political,
social, economic and ethical views when interpreting and applying the
law. Furthermore, accountability advances democratic principles by
legitimizing popular vote.'
The second part of this paper outlines various ideologies regarding a
judge's proper political and social role when exercising power and en-

gaging in decision making. The third part discusses the three primary
selection and retention methods currently used and the effects of Political
Action Committees ("PACs") on campaign expenditures. The final sec-
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1. See Peter D. Webster, Selection and Retention of Judges: Is There One "Best" Method?,
23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1995). See also Philip L. Dubois, Accountability, Independence, and
the Selection of State Judges: The Role of Popular Elections, 40 Sw. L.J. 31, 34 (1986) (stating that
the selection and retention of judges reflects contradictory ideas of the role of the courts).
2. See Webster, supra note 2, at 2.
3. See Dubois, supra note 1, at 34.
4. See Harold See, Comment: Judicial Selection and Decisional Independence, 61 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 141, 142 (1998).
5. See Dubois, supra note I, at 34.
6. See Webster, supra note 2, at 3.
7. See Dubois, supra note 1, at 34.
8. See Webster, supra note 2, at 11.
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tion of the paper asserts that an election system better serves democratic
principles.
Rather than replacing election systems with either appointment or
merit systems, meaningful reforms must be instituted. Lengthening judicial terms, reforming campaign financing, eliminating constraints on
judicial speech, and increasing voter education are a few reforms that
will increase voter participation, add legitimacy to the institution, and
decrease the negative effects that are associated with current elections.
II. JUDICIAL THEORY AND JUDICIAL SELECTION AND RETENTION:
DIFFERING VIEWS REGARDING THE COURT'S ROLE IN AMERICAN
SOCIETY

The debate over the judiciary's proper role dates to the nation's
founding. 9 The argument about whether a selection method should serve
judicial accountability or independence is limited to the state arena and
does not extend into the federal sphere.'0 Judicial independence is interpreted to mean that judicial decisions will be decided fairly, impartially,
and in good faith without outside considerations" and without judicial
accountability to the electorate for judicial conduct.
Central to the debate on whether a selection system should preserve
judicial independence 2 or accountability' 3 is what political and social
role a judge should play. If it is believed that a judge applies a wellestablished body of legal rules and principles, then accountability to the
electorate is of secondary concern.' 4 A judge is better able to make fair
judicial decisions in the absence of outside influences and
and impartial
I5
pressures.
A particular candidate's training and legal knowledge is the key in
the selection process with professional peers or other judges considered
to be the most qualified to assess and recognize a particular judicial can-

9.
10.

See id. at 2
Federal judges are appointed to a life tenure with removal for cause. Therefore, popular

criticism will not affect the judge's independence. See Steven Lubet, Judicial Discipline and
JudicialIndependence, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 59, 59 (1998).
11. See id. at 61.
12. There are two aspects to judicial independence: (1) institutional independence: judicial
independence from executive and legislative branch control; and (2) decisional independence: the
theory that judges should decide a case on the merits free from outside pressures and influences.
Webster, supra note 1, at 4. See also, Erwin Chemerinsky et al., What is Judicial Independence?
Views from the Public, the Press, the Profession, and the Politicians,80 JUDICATURE 73, 74 (1996)
(defining judicial independence similarly).
13. Accountability is used to denote accountability to the majority of the electorate.
14. Judicial accountability is seen as less of a concern if a judge exercises no discretion or
independent power but is viewed as society's conscience. See Dubois, supra note I, at 36-37.
15. A judge should be free from public pressure but should also be free from his or her own
personal, social, political, or economic views. See id. at 36.
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didate's qualifications. 6 Under this system, judicial peers select and retain judges and conduct periodic performance reviews. 7 Essential to true
independence are life tenure, salary protection, and removal for cause
subject to a constitutionally adequate procedure. Institutional appellate
review and peer pressure serve as a check on judicial discretion and erroneous decisions.' 9
Other commentaries believe that a judge's social and political role is
expansive and that there are no institutional constraints on judicial discretion and decision-making. Because judges are, in fact, vested with
partisan political authority and judicial acts and decisions are influenced
in a politically partisan manner, then judges should be democratically
accountable to the electorate. 20 Direct political accountability to an electorate is a check on unlimited judicial discretion.2'
A third view in determining a judge's political and social role focuses on the jurisdictional level of the court.22 Because a trial and intermediate appellate court judge is engaged in applying a well-established
body of legal rules and principles, judicial discretion and decisionmaking is limited and constrained by the job's intrinsic nature.23 Judicial
discretion is inherently limited because creating new law is a very small
part of what a judge actually does.24 A judge will be acting in a legislative capacity only when engaging in statutory interpretation. 2' Greater
independence is allowed and direct political accountability to the electorate is unnecessary because statutory interpretation is a minute part of the
judge's judicial duties.26 Institutional appellate review, constitutional
amendment, or legislative action are checks on unpopular judicial decisions and the development of new law.27
A fourth view of a judge's political and social role is a formalism
approach. The belief is that a judge's purpose is to protect individual
16.
17.

See Webster, supra note 1, at 5.
See, e.g., Harold J. Laski, The Techniques of Judicial Appointment, 24 MICH. L. REV. 529,

538 (1926).
18. See Irving R. Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, in THIRTY-FOURTH ANNUAL
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO LECTURE 17-18 (The Assoc. of the Bar of the City of New York. 1979).

19. Seeid. at31.
20. See Ray M. Harding, The Case for Partisan Election of Judges, 55 A.B.A. J. 1162, 1163
(1969).
21. See id.
22. See Joseph R. Grodin, Developing a Consensus of Constraint: A Judge's Perspective on
JudicialRetention Elections, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1969, 1974-76 (1988).
23. See Dubois, supra note 1, at 36-37.
24. Under this view there are two types of judiciary created law. The first is modifying,
extending or contracting the common law. The second type is statutory interpretation as a gap filler

where a statute is ambiguous or silent regarding the case before the court. See Webster, supra note 1,
at 6.
25. See id. at 6-7.
26. See Lawrence A. Alexander, Legal Theory and Judicial Accountability: A Comment on
Seidman, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1601, 1605 (1988).
27. See Grodin, supra note 22, at 1976.
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liberties and minority rights from encroachment by the electorate majority.2" Judicial independence and discretion are essential when minority
and individual rights conflict with the majority's will. 29 Accordingly,
judges are seen as activists and are expected to change the law in order to
protect individual and minority rights. 9 Because of tension between the
majority and minority, changes in the law may be unpopular with the
electorate or other government branches.' Judicial independence and
freedom from majority retaliation is critical in order for a judge to perform effectively. As Alexander Hamilton stated, "Periodical appointments, however regulated, or by whomsoever made, would, in some way
or other, be fatal to their [judge's] necessary independence." 32 The court
in Chisom v. Roemer,33 echoes this view:
public opinion should be irrelevant to the judge's role because the
judge is often called upon to disregard, or even to defy, popular sentiment. The Framers of the Constitution had a similar understanding
of the judicial role, and as a consequence, they established that Article III judges would be appointed, rather than elected, and would be
sheltered from public opinion by receiving life tenure and salary protection. 34
However, judicial independence from accountability to other government branches or the electorate may not be practically or factually
accurate. First, judicial independence does not guarantee that judges will,
in fact, protect individual liberties or minorities' rights.35 Second, state
judges may not require the same degree of independence as federal
judges because most civil rights cases are brought in federal court not
state court.36 Third, the judicial independence argument assumes that the

28. As Hamilton put it:
This independence of judges is equally requisite to guard the Constitution and the rights
of individuals from the effects of those ill humors which the arts of designing men or the
influence of particular conjunctures sometimes disseminate among the people
themselves, and which, though they speedily give place to better information and more
deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in the meantime, to occasion dangerous
innovations in the government, and serious oppressions of the minor party in the
community.
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 231 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 1966). Additionally,

Hamilton expressed a structuralist view of judicial independence. Judges need to be free from
influence and encroachment by the legislative and executive branch. Id.
29. See Grodin, supra note 22, at 1979.
30. See Webster, supra note 2, at 7.
31. See Kaufman, supra note 18, at 9.
32. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 29, at 232.
33. 501 U.S. 380 (1991).
34. Chisom, 501 U.S. at 400.
35. See Dubois, supra note 1, at 39.
36. As a result, state courts will rarely decide cases involving minority fights or individual
liberties, thus decreasing the need for judicial independence. See Robert S. Thompson, Judicial
Retention Elections and Judicial Method: A Retrospective on the California Retention Election of
1986, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 2007, 2055-56 (1988).
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democratic electoral process inherently corrupts judges. 7 This author
believes that an individual possesses a corrupt nature and it is the individual, not the system, which guides individual choice.
A judicial independence argument also contains the correlated argument that a perception of judicial independence and propriety must be
maintained." Judicial authority, judicial legitimacy, and judicial effectiveness are products of public support and respect for the judiciary.
Public respect for the institution is produced by the belief that judicial
decisions are made fairly and impartially based on the merits of a particular case, and not from outside influences.39 Therefore, even if judges
remain free from outside pressure, there may be a perception that a judicial decision was influenced by political considerations"° and the institution as a whole is devalued. 4' Respect for the institution and the rule of
law is needed for voluntary compliance with the law. If people believe
that judges are deciding cases because of outside influences then people
will fail to voluntarily comply with the law or use the courts to solve
problems. 42 Additionally, public perception of a biased and unfair system
is prevalent among minorities holding a belief that there is unequal
treatment in the justice system. 43 Furthermore, the lack of confidence in
the legal system is evidenced by an increase of pro se litigants particularly in the area of family law. 4
Independence supporters argue that election systems are more likely
to produce perceptions of influence and corruption. 41 Political campaigning and fundraising create the impression that judicial decisions are
exchanged for votes.46 As a result, public confidence in the institution is
diminished and judicial decisional independence is constrained.
Additionally, it is claimed that judges should remain independent
and unaccountable to the electorate because judges are unique and do not

37. See id. at 2056-57.
38. See Webster, supra note 1, at 9-10.
39. Outside influences can include special interest groups or popular opinion. See Abner J.
Mikva, How Should We Select Judges In a Free Society?, 16 S. ILL. U. L.J. 547, 555 (1992).
40. Political is used in the sense that the decision will most likely result in the judge
continuing to hold office. A judge will be more concerned in making a decision that will keep him
employed.
41. See Webster, supra note 1. at 9-10.
42. See Wood R. Foster Jr., The MSBA and the Courts, Bench and Bar of Minn. (Mar. 2000),
available at http://www2.mnbar.org/benchandbar/2000/mar00/prezpage-3-00.htm.
43. See id.
44. Id. However, the increase of pro se litigation may be the result of more than the erosion of
public confidence in judges and may be the result of a lack of confidence in attorneys, the increased
ease of pro se divorces, and attorney fees.
45. See id.
46. See Robert Moog, Campaign Financing for North Carolina's Appellate Courts, 76
JUDICATURE 68, 70 (1992).
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act in a legislative capacity. Judicial accountability to the electorate is
unnecessary because judges apply but do not make law. 8 The need for
representation and democratic accountability is lessened because courts
do not act in a representative capacity and are legally prohibited from
having constituents.49
Accountability addresses a number of practical concerns. First,
judges function in a legislative capacity and make policy when engaging
in statutory interpretation or departing from prior case law.5° Judicial
policy decision-making is in opposition to the democratic principles
upon which the nation was founded.5 Second, judges are human and can
make mistakes. Therefore, they should be accountable to the electorate
for erroneous decisions.52 Third, elections contribute to judicial account-5
ability, increase voter awareness and interest, and produce better judges. 1
III. METHODS OF SELECTION AND RETENTION
A. Appointment
In the majority of states, regardless of the selection system used, initial judicial selection is made by gubernatorial appointment to fill unexpired terms.54 Six states and the federal government use appointments as
the exclusive selection method 5 Selection procedures vary among the
states. 516 Current methods are appointment by the legislature,
the governor, and merit selection through nominating committees.57

47.

See Robert P. Davidow, Judicial Selection: The Search for Quality and Representiveness,

31 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 409, 420-25 (1981) (discussing differences between judges and legislators

concerning accountability).
48. Id. at 420-22.
49. See John L. Hill, Jr., Comments on Thompson and Observations Concerning Impartiality,
61 S. CAL. REV. 2065 (1988). See also, Norman Krivosha, In Celebrationof The 50' Anniversary of
Merit Selection, 74 JUDICATURE 128 (1990) (reviewing Missouri's merit system).
50. See Webster, supra note 2, at 6.
51. See Edward Chemerinsky, Evaluating Judicial Candidates, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1985, 1988
(1988).
52. See Webster, supra note 1, at 11.
53. See Mark Hansen, A Run for the Bench, The Taint of Big Money in Judicial Elections is
Moving Reformers to Find a Middle Ground Between Free-Spending Campaigns and Merit
Selection, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1998, at 70.
54. See Philip L. Dubois, State Trial Court Appointments, Does the Governor Make a
Difference?, 69 JUDICATURE 20, 20 (1985). In Minnesota, almost ninety percent of the judges
obtained their seats through appointment. See Barbara L. Jones, High Court Races are off to a
Running Start, 2000 MINN. LAW., 2-3 (2000), available at http://www.minnlawyer.constory.

asp?storyid+ 1045.
55. See PATRICK M. MCFADDEN, ELECTING JUSTICE: THE LAW AND ETHICS OF JUDICIAL
ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 177 (1990) (explaining that Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, and Virginia use appointments); U.S CONST. art H, § 2, cl. 2.
56. In Maine, the governor appoints, subject to legislative confirmation, supreme and superior
court judges for a 7-year term with re-appointment for 7-year terms. McFadden, supra note 56, at
181. The New Hampshire governor, with the approval of a five member executive council, appoints
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Proponents of the appointment system to select and retain judges
argue that judicial independence is guaranteed because judges are insulated from criticism and threats of removal and do not have to rely on
popular approval for their decisions. Democratic principles are served by
indirect accountability to the public through the elected appointing
authority.58

Appointment advocates are concerned with the negative effects that
campaign financing, fundraising, and conduct has on judicial performance. 59 Fundraising and election contests by judicial candidates create
public distrust of judicial fairness, independence and competence.60
Candidates not having to compete in contested, contentious, and raucous
elections maintain the appearance of judicial propriety and independence. 6' In order to maintain independence, judges must be appointed to
long or life terms of office, 62 be ensured salary protection, and must be
removed only for cause.63
Supporters also contend that the appointment process results in better-qualified judges.6 First, because negative campaigning costs are not
supreme and superior court judges. Id. at 183. The judges hold office until age 70. Id. In New Jersey,
the governor, with advice and consent of the senate, appoints supreme court, appeals court and
superior court judges for 7-year terms. Id. The governor, with advice and consent, may re-appoint
until age 70. Id. Rhode Island's Supreme Court justices and superior court judges are appointed for
life. Id. at 185. South Carolina's legislature appoints supreme court justices for a 10-year term and
court of appeals and circuit court judges for a 6-year term. Id. The legislature can re-appoint for
additional terms. Id. Virginia Supreme Court justices are appointed by the legislature for 12-year
terms, and the court of appeals and circuit court judges for 8-year terms. Id. at 187. The legislature
can reappoint for the same terms. Id.
57. See William M. Pearson & David S. Castle, Alternative Judicial Selection Devices: An
Analysis of Texas Judges' Attitudes, 73 JUDICATURE 34, 34 (1989).
58. See Anthony Champagne, The Selection and Retention of Judges in Texas, 40 Sw. L.J. 53,
58 (1986); see also HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 33-34 (6' ed. 1993) (arguing that
executive appointment is better than a system where judges are in politics and the electorate has to
become familiar with judges' adjudicatory history).
59. See Kurt M. Brauer, The Role of Campaign Fundraising in Michigan's Supreme Court
Elections: Should We Throw The Baby Out With the Bathwater?, 44 WAYNE L. REV. 367, 369
(1998). Advocates are also concerned with the real and perceived negative effects on judicial
functioning. See Maura A. Schoshinski, Towards an Independent, Fair, and Competent Judiciary:
An A rgumentfor Improving Judicial Elections, 7 GEO. J.LEGAL ETHICS 839, 842-43 (1994).
60. See Schoshinski, supra note 60, at 839-40.
61.
See Laski, supra note 18, at 531-32.
62. "As to the tenure by which judges are to hold their places... all judges who may be
appointed by the United States are to hold their offices during good behavior..." THE FEDERALIST,
No. 78, at 226 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 1966). See also, ABRAHAM, supra note
59, at 21-22 (arguing that judges are ideally impartial and must be given independence, security and
tenure).
63. See Webster, supra note 2, at 9.
64. It should be noted that there is also disagreement on the training and experience needed to
produce the most qualified candidates. Some believe that judges should be those who possess a great
deal of trial experience. Others argue that judicial candidates should include a broad base of
experiences such as academicians, government and corporate attorneys, and those without litigation
experience. See Lawrence H. Averill, Jr.. Observations on the Wyoming Experience with Merit
Selection of Judges: A Model for Arkansas, 17 U. ARK. LIrTLE ROCK L. REV. 281,319 (1995).
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present in the appointment system, the most qualified lawyers will seek
judicial posts. Second, the electorate is incapable of making an informed
decision on judicial qualifications 6 and is more likely to be influenced by
political or personal considerations. As a result, the populace elects
judges who are not the most qualified but rather the easiest to elect.
Third, a committee or individual possessing a greater knowledge of judicial qualifications and responsibilities is responsible for selecting judicial
6 Therefore, judges will be selected on merit and
candidates.&
not from
emotional or political considerations.
Appointment methods may also promote diversity in the judiciary's
composition. Commentators argue that the judicial independence from
the electorate results in more women and minority judges than elective
systems. 67
The appointive system's greatest strength is also its greatest weakness. There is no guarantee that judicial decisions will be decided fairly
and impartially even though judges are free from all limits on their decision-making. There is no substantive check on judicial decision-making
and discretion after the initial appointment.68 The trade off for judicial
independence is the risk that judges will pursue personal agendas that are
in conflict with their judicial responsibilities.69
Furthermore, political considerations are not absent in the appointment system. Gubernatorial and legislative appointments are often based
on political considerations 7° rather than on judicial qualifications. 7' Generally, judicial appointments are more likely to embrace the same political principles as the appointing authority.72 Additionally, former legislators are more likely to be judicial appointments in systems where the
legislature is the appointing agency.73 As a result, the appointment
65. "Given the nature of the judicial elections, voters lack clues to gage [sic] the merits of
individual candidates, such as party affiliations, committee assignments, voting records, press
releases or policy positions." The Price of Justice: A Los Angeles Area Case Study in Judicial
Campaign Financing, Frontline, at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/justice/que/
studies.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2001) (discussing the findings of a survey conducted by the 1995
California Commission on Campaign Financing).
66. See, ABRAHAM, supra note 59, at 25-27.
67. See Nicholas Alozie, Distributionof Women and Minority Judges: The Effects of Judicial
Selection Methods, 71 SOC. SC. Q. 315, 315 (1990).
68. See Champagne, supra note 59, at 58.
69. See Webster, supra note 2, at 42 n.67.
70. The appointing authority may be concerned with ideology, party loyalty, and friendship.
See Champagne, supra note 59, at 58.
71. See Dubois, supra note 55, at 25.
72. See id. See also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDING COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE, COMMISSION ON STATE JUDICIAL SELECTION STANDARDS, STANDARDS ON STATE

JUDICIAL SELECTION 16 (July 2001) (asserting that executive branch officials choose candidates

with similar political leanings).
73. See John J. Korzen, Comment, Changing North Carolina'sMethod Of Judicial Selection,
25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 253, 274 (1990).
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method may not lessen partisan politics, but instead may play a significant role in appointing judges.74
Also, appointment methods do not guarantee that money will not
play a factor in influencing a candidate's selection.75 Large amounts of
money were spent to defeat Judge Bork's nomination to the United
States Supreme Court76 and to support Clarence Thomas during the confirmation hearings.77
B. The Merit selection system and Missouri Plan7
The Missouri Plan is a combination of appointment and election
systems. There are three elements to the Missouri Plan:
1.

A nonpartisan commission nominates qualified individuals.

2.

The governor or executive appoints a nominee to a judicial post.

3.

Retention elections follow the initial term.79

The Missouri plan is the archetype for reforming state judicial election processes. 0 Approximately 34 states and the District of Columbia
use a form of merit selection. Six states use a combination of commissions and retention elections." Ten other states use merit selection for
some judges 3 In Missouri, merit selection is used for appellate court
judges and some of the circuit courts,8 which resulted from a distrust of
the elective and appointment systems." The goal of the merit selection
system is to obtain an "intelligent and impartial" judiciary, eliminate the

74. "If the power of making them [periodic appointments] was committed either to the
Executive or legislature, there would be danger of an improper complaisance to the branch which
possessed it; if to both, there would be an unwillingness to hazard the displeasure of either..." THE
FEDERALIST, No. 78, supra note 29, at 232.
75. See Harold See, supra note 5, at 146.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 146-47.
78. Although there is a difference between merit systems and the Missouri plan, commentators
also use the designations interchangeably. See e.g., id. at 143-144.
79. See James E. Lozier, The Missouri Plan A/K/A Merit Selection is the Best Solution for
Selecting Michigan Judges, 75 MIcH. Bus. L.J. 918, 920 (1996).
80. See Brauer, supra note 60, at 379.
81. See Lozier, supra note 80 at 918-920.
82. Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Nebraska, Utah, and Wyoming. See id.
83. Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Missouri, New York, Oklahoma, South
Dakota, and Tennessee. See id.
84. See Lozier, supra note 80, at 920. The plan is used in 5 out of the 45 metropolitan circuit
courts. Id. These circuit courts include the most populated counties of St. Louis and Jackson County.
85.

See id.
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chaotic results of the election system, and alleviate judicial candidates
86
from campaign pressures.
The distinguishing feature of the merit system is nonpartisan nominating committees.8 ' Nonpartisan nomination committees insulate gubernatorial political influences from an initial selection committee.88 Attorneys, judges, and lay people serve on the committee for a six-year staggered term. 89 The staggered six-year terms were designed to keep the
commission free from domination by the appointing executive.' The
governor must select from a list of three candidates that the committee
recommends.9 The candidate is initially appointed to a one-year term.92
After the initial term, the judge runs in an uncontested retention election
for a six-year term if a trial judge or a twelve-year term if an appellate
judge.93 Voters cast a yes or no ballot when asked if the judge should
remain in office.' If the majority votes not to retain the judge in office
then another candidate is selected and the process begins anew.95
Merit selection advocates argue that the system assures a competent
judiciary free from political affiliation,96 while allowing popular accountability in a retention election.97 Proponents argue that choosing judges
according to professional standards will produce a better-qualified candidate. 98 The problem with the claim that a merit system produces a more
professional judge is that it is difficult to define and evaluate the qualities
that make a good judge.99 Also, other factors beside the method of selection and retention affect the quality of the judiciary.' °°
Advocates argue that judicial stability is advanced because there is
little turnover in retention elections.'0 ' Stability is increased because

86. See John M. Scheb, H, State Appellate Judge's Attitudes Toward Judicial Merit Selection
and Retention: Results of a National Survey, 72 JUDICATURE 170, 170 (1988).
87. See Lozier, supra note 80, at 920.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See Honorable Jay A. Dougherty, The Missouri Nonpartisan Court Plan: A Dinosaur on
the Edge of Extinction or a Survivor in a Changing Socio-Legal Environment?, 62 Mo. L. REV. 315,
318 (1997). The judge must receive at least 50% of the votes cast. Id.
94. See Lozier, supranote 80, at 920.
95. See id.
96. See Brauer, supra note 60, at 379.
97. See Lozier, supra note 80, at 921.
98. See Scheb, supra note 87, at 170.
99. See Dubois, supra note 2, at 33.
100. Formal qualifications such as age and length of practice, salaries and benefits, pension
plans, retirement laws, length of terms, judicial discipline procedures, and the court's physical
environment are all factors that affect the makeup and quality of judicial candidates. See id.
101. See Dougherty, supra note 94, at 317, 320.
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judges are less likely to be disciplined or removed.3'° Supporters also
argue that retention elections lessen the appearance of judicial
corruption' 3 because retention election costs are low, reducing the risk
that judges are selling decisions for votes. '°4 In addition, judges are freed
from the campaigning distractions of contested elections.
However, the reality is that large sums of money are spent in reten'6
tion elections in order to influence the outcome of particular elections. 0
In California, opponents raised over seven million dollars to defeat California Supreme Court Justice Rose Bird.'0 7 Furthermore, Justice Bird and
two incumbent California Supreme Court justices spent over four million
dollars in the same election.'00
Some supporters argue that judges selected from this system are less
political than judges from other selection systems.' °9 However, in reality,
the retention system is not devoid of political influences."0 "The political
aspects of the process are transferred from an elected and accountable
official to a committee that is not elected by the people.''''.. There is also
a greater chance for political patronage because a committee recommends to the Governor who then appoints the candidate." 2
Additionally, "the organized bar asserts too great an influence in the
selection process."' 3 In the federal selection process the American Bar
Association's influence in selecting federal judges was perceived as too
great and as a result there is discussion of removing the ABA from the
initial screening process."'4 Commentary surrounding the President's
decision highlighted the political aspects of the selection process."'
Appointed officials can be influenced by threats of removal, impeachment, or requests for resignation in cases where a judge rendered
decision.16 Judge
Harold Baer's
pro-defendant suppression
an unpopular dcs.
Jug•arl
ae'spo-eedatsppeso

102. See Lozier, supra note 80, at 923.
103. See Scheb, supra note 87. at 170.
104. See Lozier, supra note 80, at 921.
105. See id.
106. See Harold See, supra note 4, at 146.
107. Paul Carrington, Judicial Independence and Democratic Accountability in Highest State
Courts, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 83 (1998).
108. Id. at 83.
109. See Scheb, supra note 87, at 174 (defining the term "political" as holding elective public
office before joining the appellate courts).
110. See Brauer, supra note 60, at 379.
1I1. Lozier, supra note 80, at 921.
112. See Brauer, supra note 60, at 379.
113. Scheb, supra note 87, at 172.
114. See Carl Tobias, Federal Judicial Selection in a Time of Divided Government, 47 EMORY
L.J. 527 (1998).
115. See Michael J. Slinger et al., The Senate Power of Advice and Consent on Judicial
Appointments: An Annotated Research Bibliography, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 106 (1989).
116. Jerome B. Meites et al., Justice James D. Heiple: Impeachment and the Assault on
Judicial Independence, 29 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 741 (1998).
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ruling in United States v. Bayless"7 led to Senator Dole threatening impeachment if Judge Baer did not reverse his ruling."8 President Clinton
intimated that he might request Judge Baer's resignation if the ruling
remained the same." 9 In a Motion for Reconsideration, Judge Baer sub-

sequently ruled for the government stating that the search was20 justified as
a result of additional evidence produced by the government.'
The merit selection system is also undemocratic. Merit selection
insulates judges from the electorate and decreases accountability. 2'
Judges are selected from a small group of candidates, and the nomination
process is done in secret. 1 2 Voter apathy and ignorance about qualifications is demonstrated by low voter turnout in retention elections.12' Furthermore, retention elections allow for lifetime
tenure since few candi24
dates are defeated in retention elections.1
125

C. Elections

Approximately 82% of state appellate courtjudges and 87% of state
trial court judges run in some type of election. 16 Thirty percent of trial
judges have initial terms of four years128or less.127 Initial terms for 28% of
appellate judges are two years or less.
Although the majority of judicial elections are uncontested, elections are becoming more contentious and malicious. 29 Single issues such
as the "death penalty, criminal law enforcement, and reproduction
choices have assured controversial elections.', 30 The dominant issues in
elections systems are the effect of judicial accountability to the elector-

117. 913 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), vacated on reconsideration by 921 F. Supp. 211
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (ruling that under the Fourth Amendment police officers did not have reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity for an investigative stop of the defendant's automobile and as a result
suppression of the videotaped confession and $4 million in drugs was warranted).
118. Michael J. Gerhardt, Impeachment Defanged and Other Institutional Ramifications of the
Clinton Scandals, 60 MD. L. REV. 59, 74 (2001).
119. Id.
120. United States v. Bayless, 921 F.Supp. 211, 216-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
121.
See Dougherty, supra note 94, at 322.
122. Id. at 319.
123.
See id. at 322.
124. See Champagne, supra note 59, at 62. Only one percent of judges were defeated in
retention elections. Id.
125.
See Harold See, supra note 4, at 142 (defining popular elections as the direct and contested
election by the populace).
126. See Report and Recommendation of the American Bar Association Task Force on
Lawyer's Political Contributions, Part 111,at 3 n.] (July 1998), at http://www.abanet.org/scripts.asp.
127.
Id. at 4 (increasing to 44% when mid-term vacancies are included).
128.
Id. (increasing to 69% when judges are appointed to mid-term vacancies are included).
129. See id.
130. See Kathryn Abrams, Some Realism About Electorism: Rethinking Judicial Campaign
Finance, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 505, 512 (1999).
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ate, the appearance of judicial impropriety, and corruption resulting from
skyrocketing campaign costs and fundraising.
3
1. Partisan Elections '

Partisan elections resulted from the popular democracy period during Andrew Jackson's presidency and were a reaction to appointment
methods. 32 "Wealthy landowners needed to control the judiciary because
they were constantly engaged in landlord-tenant disputes."' 3 3 Elections
were instituted to promote "Jacksonian Democracy" and break landowner judicial control.'3
The popular sentiment was that the appointment method produced
corrupt, elitist, and arrogant judges because judicial discretion was unconstrained by the majority's will. 35 Popular opinion was that appointed
judges "invalidated laws enacted by democratically elected
legislatures."' 36 As a result, "elections allowed the judiciary to unite
popular support to counter legislative and executive power."' 3 7 Currently,
eight states use partisan elections as a judicial selection method'3 8 "with
33.9% of state judges running in contested partisan elections.' 39 Partisan
elections serve democratic and constitutional principles and promote
participation'4 by ensuring judicial accountability. 4 ' There is a public
expectation that judges should be answerable for misconduct.'4 2 Incompetent judges can be removed by facing the electorate for periodic elections. Since judges, through interpreting statutes, act like legislators and

131. See Harold See, supra note 5, at 142 (defining partisan election as a judicial candidate
being identified with a political party).
132. See Webster, supra note 1,at 16. The original 13 colonies had 3 appointment systems:
appointment by the legislature, by the governor and a council, and appointment by the governor with
council approval. Id. at 13.
133. Lozier, supra note 80, at 918. But see Dubois, supra note 1, at 35 (explaining that partisan
elections were influenced by moderate Whig, Republican and Democratic lawyers and judges).
134. See Berkson, supra note 82, at 71.
135. Seeid. at71 n.78.
136. See Lozier, supra note 80, at 918.
137. Dubois, supra note 1.at 35.
138. Erwin Chemerinsky, Preserving an Independent Judiciary: The Need for Contribution
and Expenditure Limits in Judicial Elections, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 133, 134 (1998). Alabama
judges are reelected every 6 years. MCFADDEN, supra note 55, at 178. Illinois appellate court judges
are elected for an initial 10-year term and retention elections every 10 years thereafter. Id. at 180.
Circuit court judges are elected to an initial 6-year term and then retention elections every 6 years.
Id. All North Carolina judges are elected for 8-year terms of office. Id. at 184. In Pennsylvania, all
judges are elected for 10-year terms and then subject to retention elections every 10 years. Id. at 185.
In Texas, appellate judges are elected for 6-year terms and district court judges for 4-year terms. Id.
at 186. West Virginia appellate judges are elected every 12 years and circuit court judges for 8-year
terms. Id. at 187.
139. Chemerinsky, supra note 139, at 136.
140. See Hansen, supra note 54, at 70.
141. Id.
142. See Lubet, supra note 11,at 60.
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make new law and public policy, they should be responsible to the electorate for their decisions.'43
Party identity simplifies fund raising efforts and increases judicial
campaign contributions.' Identity with a particular party may aid a can14
5
didate in garnishing votes for those who vote by party identification.
However, party identity can also hurt particular candidates and result in
party candidates being defeated if voters
46 are reacting against a specific
party, particularly in off-year elections.
Opponents argue that current campaign elections and "fundraising
practices are a serious threat to judicial independence. 4' 7 Elections create
concerns about judicial corruption and impartiality. 4 8 The view is that
current elections and campaign financing create an impression of impropriety, bringing into question a judge's ability to impartially interpret and
apply laws and administer justice.'4 9 "There is also a concern that if
judges can be influenced by campaign contributions then they will be
unable to resist the difficulties that a judge
5' 0 faces through friendships and
associations that come before the court. '
One reason for the high costs of judicial campaigns is the use of
television and radio to educate the public about judicial elections.'5 '
"Commercial slate mailers have also increased the costs of election campaigns,, because
positions are often sold to the candidate who can pay the
52
most. '
It is further argued that "judicial decision-making will be influenced
by the fear that the electorate will retaliate for unpopular decisions. '
Judicial decisions protecting constitutional rights, the environment, and
consumer interests are producing visible and controversial judicial actions resulting in more contentious and costly judicial elections l 4 It is
argued that the fear of removal by the electorate pressures a judge to
"neutralize or avoid criticism" by tempering judicial decisions and re-

143. See Harding, supra note 20, at 1163.
144. See Brauer, supra note 60, at 372. Currently, Minnesota's Code of Judicial Conduct,
Canon 5, forbids party endorsement. However, there is a case currently pending in the Eighth Circuit
to allow endorsements. Id.
145. See Harold See, supranote 5, at 142-43.
146. See id.
147. Chemerinsky, supra note 139, at 134.
148. See Brauer, supra note 60, at 374.
149. See id.; Chemerinsky, supra note 139, at 138.
150. Thomas R. Phillips, Comment, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127, 136-37 (1998).
151. Abrams, supra note 130, at 525.
152. Id.
153. Pamela S. Karlan, Two Concepts of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 535, 540
(1999).
154. See Roy A. Schotland, Statement of Roy A. Schotland Before the Joint Select Committee
on the Judiciaryof the Texas Legislature, 72 JUDICATURE 154, 155 (1988).
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ducing the judge's willingness to protect minority rights and individual
liberties.'55
However, judicial activism should rarely occur in state trial courts.
Trial court decisions generally apply legal rules to facts. Rarely does a
trial court engage in constitutional issues or statutory interpretation,
which are the two largest areas that produce judicial activism and controversial decisions. Additionally, appellate courts serve as an institutional check on judicial activism in trial courts.
One commentator argues that since popular sentiment plays no role
in judicial decision-making or function it is inappropriate "to hold judges
accountable to the will of the people."'' 1 6 However, this view is dependent
on a belief that a judge simply applies law to a particular case and does
not engage in policy making. 57 This argument is weakened when judicial
decisions affect the greater populace. Furthermore, this argument does
not take into account that a positive image of the judiciary is needed for
the people to voluntarily obey the rule of law and not resort to self-help
techniques.
Election rivals argue that judicial neutrality or the appearance of
neutrality is threatened because contributors are attorneys, special interest groups, or litigants who appear before the judge. 58 It is feared that
judges will not be able to render a decision in a case against those who
are past or future contributors. 59 There is an additional concern that litigants, lawyers or others will actively campaign against a judge in retaliation for an unpopular decision. 6'
Attorney contributions are not as sinister as election rivals argue.
First, attorneys rarely comprise greater than 50% of the contributors of a
particular campaign. 6' Second, lawyers who are more frequently exposed
to judges should know which judges are worthy of support and which are
not. 162
Opponents argue that the appearance of impropriety resulting from
elections will erode public confidence in the judicial system. 63 The alarm
is sounded that "no matter what, the appearance inevitably will be that
the judges' rulings were bought and paid for."' 6' High cost campaign
fundraising and contentious elections discourage qualified judicial can155. See Chemerinsky et al., supra note 13, at 76.
156. Krivosha, supra note 49, at 132.
157. See id. (defining "judging" as the act of deciding on the merits of a matter).
158. See Chemerinsky, supra note 139, at 138.
159. Id. at 134, 138.
160. See id.
161. See Schotland, supra note 155, at 155.
162. See id.
163. "[L]itigants and the public will perceive that decisions were influenced by money."
Chemerinsky, supra note 139, at 138.
164. Id.
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didates from running or seeking re-election."" Few competent lawyers
are willing to surrender a successful legal career to engage in rigorous
and expensive political campaigning.'6 Election antagonists further argue
that judges are distracted from their jobs and instead focus on campaigning. 167 It is believed that voter apathy and ignorance results in 16vot8
ing along party lines and name recognition, and not on qualifications.
However, it should be noted that opponents offer no empirical evidence that campaign fundraising actually affects judicial decisionmaking 69 or the existence of actual widespread judicial corruption.' 71 In
fact, a judge may have decided in a particular manner, regardless of a
donation's source and size.' 7' Additionally, judges are guided by a judicial code of conduct that limits improper behavior 72 by requiring recusal
when a judge has a possible monetary outcome in a particular case.1
However, one commentary cites evidence that questions a judge's
im74
partiality in particular cases where a litigant is also a contributor.'
73

In Minnesota, judicial election behavior is limited by Canon 5 of the
71 5
Judicial Code of Conduct, as well as the Fair Campaign Practices Act.
Canon 5 prohibits a candidate from personally soliciting campaign contributions. 76 Additionally, judicial candidates are expected to maintain a
barrier between themselves and contributors by not knowing who contributed to their campaigns. '77 Furthermore, the Minnesota Ethics in Government Act' 8 requires disclosure of campaign contributions.'79
Elections also serve as a check on judicial discretion. Where there is
a clear rule of law, a judge should apply the rule of law regardless of the

165.
166.
167.
168.

See Webster, supra note 1, at 22.
See Lozier, supra note 80, at 921.
See Hill, supranote 49, at 2065-67.
See Dubois, supra note 1, at 45; See also Anthony Champagne, JudicialReform in Texas,
in JUDICIAL REFORM IN THE STATES 93, 97 (Anthony Champagne & Judith Haydel eds., 1993)
(explaining how voters with limited knowledge rely on party labels to cast their votes).
169. See Chemerinsky, supra note 139, at 134, 138.
170. See Karlan, supra note 154, at 540.
171. See id.
172. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1-5 (1999).
173. See id. at Canon 3E(1)(c); see also Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, 28 U.S.C. §§ 144,
455(b)(4) (1994) (applying to federal judges).
174. See Phillips, supranote 151, at 137.
175. See MODEL CODE, supra note 154, at Canon 5; See also Fair Campaign Practices, MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 21 1B.01-.21 (West 1992 & Supp. 2001) (creating a criminal statute that restricts the
written activity of elections; requires a county attorney to investigate any violations; and forbids
campaign activities by public employees, undue influence, corporate contributions or bribery).
176. See MODEL CODE, supra note 154, at Canon 5C(2).
177. See id.
178. Ethics in Government, MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 10A.01-37 (West 1997 & Supp. 2001).
179. Id. at § 10A.20(3)(c). For example, a contribution of $2,000 or more from one source to an
appellate court candidate or greater than $400 to a trial court judge must be reported within 48 hours,
as well as disclosure of contributions of $100 or more. Id. at § 10A.20(5).
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' Also, voter retaliation should be
popularity of the law or the litigant. 80
minimal or non-existent when judicial decisions are decided according to
the unambiguous rule of law.'8' However, the electorate should be able to
remove a judge when
there is no clear rule of law and judicial discretion
82
is at a maximum.'

Texas is the most frequently cited example of the evil of judicial
elections. Candidates for Texas Supreme Court elections are spending
millions of dollars.'83 In 1986, attorneys accounted for 80 to 90 percent of
the total campaign funds, in three out of four campaigns, for three Texas
Supreme Court seats.i 4 In another case, one individual contributed more
than 90% of the funds to an unsuccessful Texas Supreme Court candidate's campaign.'85
Jack Hampton, a Texas District Court Judge, demonstrates the viability of the election system. Judge Hampton imposed a 30-year sentence, rather than life imprisonment, to a murderer of two gay men. '8"7
Hampton publicly justified the sentence with homophobic remarks.'
The State Commission on Judicial Conduct censured Hampton, but did
not remove him from office.. 8 In 1992, gay rights groups organized to
defeat his election for the Texas Court of Appeals. 8 9 This demonstrates
that the election system and voter accountability is a viable selection
method when the political apparatus fails to adequately address judicial
misconduct.
There is little electorate interference with judicial independence'90
Individual decisions are generally not known or examined by the electorate. '9' Lengthy terms of office ensure that unpopular decisions will lose
their negative impact by the next election term.'92 Furthermore, most judicial incumbents are re-elected without opposition.' 93

180. See Karlan, supra note 154, at 541.
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. For example, in 1994 and 1996, over $9 million was raised between seven candidates
seeking Texas Supreme Court positions. See Hansen, supra note 53, at 70.
184. See Schotland, supra note 155, at 155.
185. See Anthony Champagne, Judicial Reform in Texas, 72 JUDICATURE 146, 149 (1988).
186. Lisa Belkin, Report Clears Judge of Bias in Remarks About Homosexuals, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 2, 1989, at A25.
187. "1don't care much for queers cruising the streets picking up teen-age boys." Id.
188. See Judge Is Censured Over Remark On Homosexuals, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1989, at
A28.
189. See Gay Rights Groups Hail Defeat of Judge in Texas, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1992, at B20.
190. See Karlan, supra note 154, at 543.
191. See Chemerinsky et al., supra note 12, at 76.
192. See Karlan, supra note 154, at 543.
193. See id. But see Webster, supra note 1, at 18 (arguing that contested judicial elections have
increased, are more heated, and are generating more voter interest).
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Contributions and Judi-

North Carolina is an example of PACs' influence on judicial elections.195 North Carolina judges are elected in partisan elections with
PACs having great influence.' 96 Thus, PACs are considered the major
reason for escalating judicial election costs in North Carolina.' 97
There is a difference between PACs' influence in general political
elections versus judicial elections. In general elections, PAC contributors
expect to impact political decisions; however they do not expect to influence judicial decision-making.' 98 Judicial codes of ethics governing campaign activities are responsible for the different expectations by insulating judicial candidates.' 99 For example, Codes of Conduct often prohibit
judicial candidates from making campaign promises other than faithfully
executing their duties. 2 °
Although the reality is that PACs have limited impact on judicial
decision-making, there is a perception that judicial quid pro quo is occurring in secret between judicial candidates and PACs. 2 ' However, this
perception is less significant in states where there are non-partisan elections, such as Michigan. 20 2
D. Non-PartisanElections
Currently, twelve states use non-partisan elections for judicial selection and retention. 23 Terms vary among the states from four to ten
years.2 4 Non-partisan judicial elections remove partisan political consequences while ensuring judicial accountability.0 5 Such elections are more
likely to produce a higher number of qualified judicial candidates than

194. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1133 (7th ed. 1999); see also Political Action Committee
(PAC), MICROSOFT ENCARTA ONLINE ENCYCLOPEDIA 2001
(Sept. 6, 2001), at
http://encarta.msn.com (defining PACS and their role of soliciting campaign contributions).
195. See Brauer, supra note 60, at 381.
196.

See Traciel V. Reid, PAC Participationin North Carolina Supreme Court Elections, 80

JUDICATURE 21, 29 (1996).

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

See Brauer, supra note 60, at 381.
See Reid, supra note 197, at 24.
See id.
See Brauer, supra note 60, at 381.
See id. at 382.
See id.
Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, North

Dakota, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin. SARA MATHIAS, ELECTING JUSTICE: A HANDBOOK
OF JUDICIAL ELECTION REFORMS 142 (American Judicature Society ed., 1990).
204. See MCFADDEN, supra note 56, at 180-87.

205. See Webster, supra note 1, at 25 (explaining that candidates do not have to be loyal to
party ideology or party factions); See also Champagne, supra note 59, at 63 (discussing how
candidate merit, not party affiliation, drives non-partisan elections).
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partisan elections.2°6 The non-partisan election system allows for democratic participation while reducing judicial turnover, which ensures stability. 20'
Non-partisan election opponents argue that voter ignorance is
prevalent in non-partisan elections. 2m Because of the absence of party
identity it is believed that in non-partisan elections, voters are more
likely to vote based on name recognition and ballot position than based
on information. 2°9 However, one study suggests that voter awareness differs according to the type of election.2 0 Voters in primary elections are
more civic minded and knowledgeable than general election voters.211
It is believed that attorneys will have a greater influence over nonpartisan elections .212 Voters being less aware of judicial qualifications
will rely more on expert advice from the legal community in electing
candidates.1 3
As in partisan elections, opponents argue that increased non-partisan
elections have eroded public confidence in the impartiality, dignity and
independence of judges.24" First, non-partisan elections are often cited for
exorbitant campaign costs. 25- Second, opponents argue that candidate's
are becoming more aggressive in elections by attacking their opponents,
stating their personal views on legal and political issues, and soliciting
support from PACs and special interest groups. 216
Ohio judicial elections are a combination of partisan and nonpartisan elements. Partisan committees nominate candidates, candidates
2' 7
compete in partisan primaries and are elected in non-partisan elections.
The Ohio Supreme Court in 1995 enacted campaign financing and fundraising rules to fight the negative perception of partisan influences.2"8
These regulations limit contributions by individuals, PACs, and political

206. See Champagne, supra note 59, at 63 (explaining that votes in a non-partisan election are
cast on a candidate's qualifications, rather than party association).
207. See Thomas E. Brennan, Nonpartisan Election of Judges: The Michigan Case, 40 Sw. L.J.
23, 26 (1986) (discussing how judicial stability is aided because incumbents in non-partisan
elections are often unopposed in reelection campaigns).
208. See Champagne, supra note 59, at 64.
209. See Lozier, supra note 80, at 920.
210. Charles H. Sheldon & Nicholas P. Lovrich Jr., Voter Knowledge, Behavior and Attitudes
in Primary and GeneralJudicial Elections, 82 JUDICATURE 216, 218 (1999).
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. See id.
214. See Initial Report on Judicial Elections and Ethics, 83 MARQ. L. R. 129 app.d at 131
(1999).
215. See Brauer, supra note 60, at 368, 376.
216. See Initial Report, supra note 214, at 131.
217. See Brauer, supranote 60, at 380.
218. See Nicole C. Allbritain, One Step Closer to Merit-Based Judicial Selection: Ohio's New
Limitations on Judicial Campaign Contributionsand Expenditures, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 1323, 1324
(1996).
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parties." 9 Additionally, non-uniform expenditure limits were imposed
depending on the court and the size of the population in the court's district."O Regulations were also adopted limiting the time frame for which
campaign contributions could be raised.2 2' The campaign finance reform's goal was to strengthen the judiciary's legitimacy by enhancing
judicial independence and accountability.222
Whether campaign reforms will have an impact remains to be seen.
Current election rhetoric still focuses on whether elections serve democratic principles and if judges are impartial.
Although it is still too early to measure the practical effects of
223
Ohio's reform laws, the courts are testing the law's constitutionality.
Ohio state court judges sought an injunction, alleging the expenditure
limits violated their First Amendment rights of free speech.224 Relying on
Buckley v. Valeo,225 the District Court stated that "a statute may constitutionally restrict campaign finances to prevent corruption or the appearance of corruption. 22 6 The court rejected the argument that judicial election is different from legislative election speech because of the uniqueness of judicial office. 227 The Court upheld the constitutionality of campaign contributions, but enjoined the imposition of the expenditures.228
Suster's ruling is important when trying to draft reform proposals to curb
the negative effects of large campaign expenditures. Unless the court
allows limits on expenditures, expensive elections will continue.
However, it should be noted that the United States Supreme Court
in Federal Election Commission v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee,229 recently held that coordinated party expenditure limits were not unduly burdensome to political parties and as a result passed
First Amendment constitutional scrutiny. 230 The Court relied on the argument that party expenditures will result in influence and corruption of
candidates.23 The Court reasoned that coordinated party expenditures
"perform functions more complex than simply electing candidates... they

219.
220.
candidate
221.
222.

See OHIO JUDICIAL CODE OF CONDUCT CANON 7(C)(5)(a) (West Supp. 2001).
See id. at Canon 7(C)(6)(d) and 7(C)(8). Canon 7(C)(6)(d) limits expenditures for a
for the court of common pleas to $75,000.
See id. at Canon 7(4)(a)-(c).
See Allbritian, supranote 218, at 1341.

223.

See Suster v. Marshall, 951 F. Supp. 693 (N.D. Ohio 1996), aff'd, 1998 FED App. 0228P

(6th Cir.).
224. Suster, 951 F. Supp. at 696.
225.

therefore
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

424 U.S. 1 (1976) (holding that campaign expenditures burdened core political speech and

must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest).
See Suster, 951 F. Supp. at 697.
See id. at 698-99.
See id. at 695.
2001 WL 703912 (June 25, 2001).
Federal Election Commission, 2001 WL 703912, at *10.
See id. at*12.
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act as agents for spending on behalf of those who seek to produce obligated officeholders." 2 It should be noted that Federal Election Committee applies to coordinated party expenditures to political candidates
and does not apply to individual candidate expenditures. 23' As a result, in
judicial elections candidates receiving money from political parties will
be affected, but candidates will still be allowed to expend large amounts
of money in elections.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE IN ELECTION SYSTEMS

In order to adequately satisfy the competing concerns of judicial
accountability and independence there must be reforms in all systems.
Rather than replacing elective systems with appointment or merit systems, reforms should be instituted that increase voter participation, and
eliminate concerns of judicial corruption.
Elections provide an aspect of judicial accountability and popular
democracy that is absent in lifetime appointment systems. However,
concerns of judicial impropriety and corruption need to be addressed.
Term length, campaign financing, and campaign conduct are three areas
where reforms must be instituted.
To address these concerns and allow for greater independence, judicial terms should be lengthened.3 One recommendation is a minimum
eight-year term for all judges. 21 Longer terms add to the attractiveness of
a judicial position by enhancing job security and decreasing competition
for judicial seats. 36 Longer terms also allow a judge to focus more on
applying the law rather than on fundraising and campaign efforts.237 Additionally, longer terms will decrease the influence that campaign costs
have on judicial elections. Furthermore, longer terms promote judicial
accountability and aid voter awareness. Voters will better be able to
evaluate a candidate's judicial record and professional behavior.23 8 How239
ever, longer terms can also isolate judges from community sentiments.
In order to prevent judicial isolation, terms should be limited to no longer
than 6 to 8 years.
Short terms subject judges to the political pressures of the electorate
or the appointing authority more often. The problem associated with
shorter terms is the need for judges to run more often and increasing the
appearance of impropriety and corruptibility associated with campaign

232,
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
may have
239.

Id.
See id. at*17.
Report and Recommendation of the American Bar Association, supra note 127 at 4.
See id. These minimum terms apply to all judges whether they are elected or appointed.
See id. at 5.
See id.
See id. However, this is dependent on voters having access to disciplinary procedures that
been instituted against a judge.
See id.
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financing. 2" Additionally, shorter terms discourage qualified candidates
from initially running and promote instability since incumbents will not
run for re-election.24' Electorate participation is thereby promoted.242
Campaign financing concerns also need to be addressed. Another
recommendation for improving the elective system is to provide public
funding for political candidates.2 43 However, there is a debate on the
scope of public funding to political candidates. Some argue that there
should be modest public funding while another view is there should be
complete funding thereby assuring impartiality. 24 One method would be
for state legislatures to fund campaigns. 24 The legislature would establish
a fund to be split among all candidates or guarantee a particular dollar
amount per candidate.246 This second alternative would allow a candidate
to better plan campaign expenditures. It would be difficult for a candidate to effectively budget in a pool arrangement since the ultimate dollar
amount would vary according to the number of candidates and legislative
expenditures which could not be known before budgeting and spending.
Another reform measure is to provide equal funding among all candidates. 247 However this raises constitutional concerns. The United States
Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo 248 held that limits on campaign expenditures violated a candidate's First Amendment rights.2 49 A reform

measure that provides for equal funding to all candidates is simply an
expenditure limit in disguise. However, given the Court's Federal Election Commission decision, expenditures by a group could be limited and
as a result reduce the perception of influence and corruption produced by
elections.
Rather than limiting expenditures, there should be reasonable limits
on campaign contributions and establishment of mandatory disclosure.
Campaign contribution limits and full disclosure requirements will
eliminate public perception that judicial decisions are being bought and
paid for. Full disclosure will allow the electorate to determine who is
giving what amounts to which judges, and adjust their political philosophy accordingly.
Furthermore, less expensive advertising means must be employed to
educate the public. 210 One alternative is for candidates to use free voter
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

See id. at 4.
See id.
See id.
See Phillips, supra note 151, at 135.
See id. at 135-136.
See Brauer, supra note 60, at 388.
See id.
See id. at 389-390.
424 U.S. 1 (1976).
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 58-59.
See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
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pamphlets if they agree not to use slate mailers. 5 ' Internet access to voter
pamphlets could also provide low cost alternatives. 2
Additionally, eliminating limits on judicial speech during elections
will provide for alternative methods of communication. The elimination
of constraints on judicial speech will serve First Amendment values,
democratic principles, and allow for a more informed body politic. The
United States Supreme Court in New York Times v. Sullivan. 3 stated that
there is "a profound national commitment to a principal that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open, and that it
may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
attacks on government and public officials." Judges should not be immune from criticism simply because reputations may be injured.25 Rather
than limiting speech, the Court recognized that the counter to negative or
damaging speech is to allow more speech. 6 In this context, judges
should be allowed to counter negative campaign rhetoric by engaging in
more speech.
However, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld restrictions on
judicial candidate speech determining that the restrictions do not violate
the First Amendment.57 The court reasoned that there is an inherent difference between the legislative and executive branches and the
judiciary.28 The court determined that in executive and legislative elections "the public has the right to know the details of the programs that
candidates propose to enact into law and administer. '' 59 However, the
court stated that the judicial system is different as it is "based on the concept of individualized decisions on challenged conduct and interpretations of law enacted by the other branches of government. '' 60 The court
further reasoned that states may regulate judicial speech because a "judicial candidate simply does not have a First Amendment right to abuse his
office." 26'
The argument that judges may be buying votes by promising to decide a certain way in particular matters is unlikely. First, appellate review
serves as a check on judicial abuse of discretion. Second, the true value
of campaign speech will allow a candidate to counter rhetoric that attacks
a judge's particular decision. A candidate, through the allowing of
greater speech will be able to explain the basis for a particular decision.
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Judicial candidates will be able to respond and neutralize single issue
groups attacking and defeating judicial candidates.
Additionally, eliminating restrictions on speech educate the body
politic. 262 Through campaign speeches, candidates can inform the public
as to the functions of a judge and the system.263 Candidates need to be
able to tell the public why an issue is important, resulting in institutional
respect and legitimacy. Finally, in order to create a more informed voting
public, voting guides should be printed and distributed.2 6
Reforming the election system will not address all the concerns with
the perception of impropriety that is inherent in the debate. The lack of
respect for the legal profession lends to the decreased respect for judges.
Popular culture is currently replete with shows about attorneys' and
judges' misconduct. 26 The People's Court, Judge Judy, Judge Mills Lane
to mention a few come into people's homes on a daily basis. As popular
culture, these shows reflect current popular beliefs and attitudes.
These shows may be an individual's only contact with the judicial
system and therefore, the only information that serves as a basis for an
individual's beliefs. In order to gain viewers and increase ratings the
Judges on these shows must create drama and controversy. The judges on
these shows frequently fail to maintain decorum through lecturing the
litigants and refusal to hear all the evidence. This negative perception of
the judicial system is perhaps the most difficult perception to neutralize
when attempting to influence voters and win elections. However, this is
not a failure of the election system but rather a failure of the institution as
a whole to win the people's respect and confidence.2 6
V. CONCLUSION

The tension between judicial accountability and independence is an
ongoing debate that encompasses concerns of a judge's social and political role and democratic principles. Furthermore, judges must maintain an
appearance of fairness and impartiality in order to foster respect for the
institution that legitimizes the judiciary in the public's eye. The founding

262. See Harold See, supra note 5 at 141-42.
263. See id.
264. See id.
265. Inside the Law Specials on Lawyers and Democracy: The Legal Profession, available at
http://www.abanet.org/litigation/programs/inside.html (last visited June 27, 2001). One survey
showed that one out of every five Americans have no respect for the legal profession. Id.
266. See 1999-2000 Public Opinion of the Courts Study Final Report, available at
http://www.courts.state.mn.us/cio/docs/public-opinion.htm (last visited Aug. 7, 2001). It should be
noted that a survey in Minnesota showed that seventy-eight percent of respondents had either "a
great deal or some confidence in the Minnesota State Courts." Id. While thirteen percent had "only a
little or no confidence at all in the Minnesota State Courts and twelve percent had little or no
confidence in the United States Supreme Court. Id.
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fathers recognized that states had election systems for state judges and
did not suggest that states abandon the established system.
Although campaign costs have increased significantly in recent
years, the solution is not to abandon elections. Instead election systems
must address concerns and make substantive reforms. Campaign contributions must be limited, and candidates need to engage in greater speech
in order to educate the electorate.

